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ANYTHING BUT A BREEZE: MOVING 
FORWARD WITHOUT NFIP WIND 
COVERAGE 
Michael A. Brown* 
Abstract: The storm season of 2005, with the indelible images of Hurri-
cane Katrina stuck in our minds forever, left much of the Gulf Coast dev-
astated. The aftermath of the storm also caused serious damage to the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP or the Program), which pro-
vides federally subsidized flood insurance to communities participating in 
the Program. Following the storms of 2005, many home and building 
owners and insurance companies began to disagree about the terms of 
their agreements and the cause of damage upon these structures. The 
main point of dispute was whether damage could be attributed strictly to 
flooding, to wind, or to a combination of both. In an effort to eliminate 
similar disputes and to enhance the ability for home and business owners 
to obtain relief for their losses, lawmakers have proposed including wind 
coverage within the NFIP. This Note will examine the NFIP and the idea 
of adding multiple peril coverage to the Program. This Note will attempt 
to explain why adding wind coverage to the NFIP will only further exac-
erbate the problems for an already fiscally irresponsible program. 
Introduction 
 The hurricane season of 2005 produced unprecedented losses in 
the private insurance industry and the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram (NFIP or the Program).1 The most severe losses incurred in 2005, 
as evidenced by the graphic images in the aftermath of Hurricane Ka-
trina, took the form of human casualties and community destruction.2 
While flooding—the most costly natural catastrophe in the United 
States—played a leading role in the devastation experienced in New 
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2009–2010. 
1 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office [GAO], National Flood Insurance Program: 
Greater Transparency and Oversight of Wind and Flood Damage Determinations 
Are Needed 9 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0828.pdf [hereinafter 
Greater Transparency Needed]. 
2 See Quynh T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program in the Aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, 12 Conn. Ins. L.J. 629, 629 (2005–2006). 
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Orleans and the other Gulf Coast communities, it was not the only 
source of damage.3 Hurricanes are multiperil events, eliciting damage 
through both flooding and wind.4 
 Following the 2005 storm season, significant disputes arose regard-
ing victims’ insurance coverage because wind and flooding damage are 
generally covered under different policies.5 For reasons discussed in 
this Note, the majority of homeowners insurance policies do not cover 
flood losses.6 Instead, flood losses are covered through the NFIP, estab-
lished in 1968 under the National Flood Insurance Act.7 Many blamed 
post-storm disputes on the private insurance market, claiming that pri-
vate insurance companies exploited government oversight to manipu-
late insurance adjustments at the expense of policy holders and the 
Federal Program.8 
 In an effort to create an option in the NFIP to offer both wind and 
flood coverage, the Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2007 was intro-
duced; it was approved by the House of Representatives and Senate as 
part of the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act.9 The Act 
was aimed at restoring the financial solvency of the NFIP while provid-
ing insurance for both flood and wind damage.10 
 This Note examines the NFIP and argues against the addition of 
wind coverage to the Program. Part I analyzes the history of the NFIP.11 
Part II explores the Gulf Coast’s flood history, paying particularly close 
attention to Hurricane Katrina.12 Part III will evaluate the financial 
turmoil the NFIP has experienced since Hurricane Katrina.13 Part IV 
                                                                                                                      
3 GAO, Natural Catastrophe Insurance: Analysis of a Proposed Combined Fed-
eral Flood and Wind Insurance Program 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d08504.pdf [hereinafter Natural Catastrophe Insurance]; Oliver Houck, 
Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 61, 62 
(1985). 
4 Natural Catastrophe Insurance, supra note 3, at 1, 2 n.1. 
5 See Office of Inspector General, OIG-08–97, Hurricane Katrina: Wind Versus 
Flood Issues 3 (2008), available at http://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/uploads/ 
2008/10/homeland-flood-wind-report-sept-2008.pdf [hereinafter Wind vs. Flood]; Greater 
Transparency Needed, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
6 Wind vs. Flood, supra note 5, at 3; see infra Part III.B.1. 
7 National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2006). 
8 See Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 Miss. L.J. 783, 783 (2008). 
9 H.R. 3121, 110th Cong. (2007); Taylor, supra note 8, at 790. 
10 H.R. 3121. 
11 See infra Part I. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III. See generally Greater Transparency Needed, supra note 1 (discuss-
ing problems and making recommendations for the NFIP in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina). 
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will dissect the potential results of adding wind coverage to the NFIP, 
concluding that a program including wind coverage will be unable to 
sustain additional liability.14 
I. National Flood Insurance Program 
A. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
 Congressional interest in flood relief began in the late 1800s as a 
number of floods produced human and economic losses along the Mis-
sissippi River basin.15 The federal government employed structural 
measures to control flooding in response to prior disasters.16 However, 
physical and economic losses piled up under the Flood Control Act of 
1936 even after the implementation of levees and barriers designed to 
protect at-risk citizens from the dangers of flooding.17 In the early 1960s, 
Hurricanes Donna, Carla, and Betsy illustrated the need for additional 
federal help.18 Through the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 
1965, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development pro-
vided a report to Congress illustrating the financial burdens of flood 
disasters and the need for flood insurance.19 
 Responding to report recommendations, Congress passed the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act of 1968, enabling the National Flood Insur-
ance Program (NFIP or the Program), with three primary purposes in 
mind.20 First, the Program would identify and map flood-prone com-
munities.21 Second, the Program would require community adoption 
and enforcement of floodplain management regulations.22 Lastly, the 
Program would provide federally subsidized flood insurance to commu-
nities who participated in the Program.23 
                                                                                                                      
14 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
15 Rawle O. King, Cong. Res. Serv., Federal Flood Insurance: The Repetitive 
Loss Problem 1 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32972.pdf. 
16 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency [FEMA], National Flood Insurance Program: 
Program Description 1 (2002), available at http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord. 
do?id=1480 [hereinafter NFIP]. 
17 Id. 
18 Houck, supra note 3, at 68. 
19 Id. at 68–69. 
20 Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 
(2006)). 
21 NFIP, supra note 16, at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
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 The Program, directed by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), requires the Director of FEMA to identify and map at-
risk communities and also establish flood-risk zones.24 The culmination 
of this study is the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM).25 Since the NFIP 
is a voluntary program, a community must apply to be identified and 
mapped according to the procedures followed by FEMA.26 There are a 
number of pieces within the NFIP, including the emergency program, 
regular program, and the “Write Your Own” program.27 
1. Emergency Program 
 The NFIP emergency program provides a first layer amount of in-
surance on all insurable structures before the effective date of a com-
munity’s initial FIRM.28 The emergency program was established to deal 
with delays between the completion of a risk study and a community’s 
insurance eligibility.29 The main element of the FIRM that guides com-
munities is the base flood elevation (BFE), which requires buildings be 
elevated or flood-proofed to the appropriate level as indicated on the 
FIRM.30 The FIRM also illustrates areas that fall within a “100-year flood” 
boundary, named the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA).31 A commu-
nity is not responsible for adhering to NFIP’s minimum floodplain re-
quirements while part of the emergency program since its risk study is 
not complete.32 However, a community must adopt adequate floodplain 
management regulations to become part of the NFIP regular pro-
gram.33 The goal of the emergency program is to promote entrance into 
the NFIP while allowing communities time to meet application re-
quirements, which includes producing a Flood Hazard Boundary 
Map.34 
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. As of August 1, 2002, 19,200 communities had been issued Flood hazard maps. 
The total cost of this map production was over $1.5 billion. Id. 
25 Houck, supra note 3, at 76. 
26 See NFIP, supra note 16, at 12; see also Houck, supra note 3, at 73. 
27 See King, supra note 15, at 9; FEMA, What Is the Write Your Own (WYO) Program?, 
http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/wyowhat.shtm (last visited May 14, 2010). 
28 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2009). 
29 See id. 
30 Houck, supra note 3, at 76–77. 
31 44 C.F.R. § 59.1; King, supra note 15, at 7. The definition falls under the title of 
“area of special flood hazard.” 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
32 King, supra note 15, at 9. 
33 Id.; see 44 C.F.R. § 59.3. 
34 See Beth Davidson, How Quickly We Forget: The National Flood Insurance Program and 
Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 365, 371 (2005). Communities 
have one year to complete the application process. Id. 
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2. Regular Program 
 A community becomes part of the regular program when a FIRM 
has been completed and the community has adopted the NFIP’s mini-
mum floodplain management regulations consistent with federal crite-
ria.35 At the minimum level, which occurs when the program Adminis-
trator has not yet defined the SFHA’s, a community is responsible for 
requiring permits for all construction or development within the com-
munity to determine if the development will occur in flood-prone ar-
eas.36 The community is required to further mitigate flood-loss risks 
through review of permit applications and proposed development.37 
Once a community becomes part of the regular program, the Director 
of the NFIP is statutorily required to make insurance available to inter-
ested residents within the community.38 In the regular program, addi-
tional flood insurance is available based upon actuarial determinations 
reflecting the probability of flood damages.39 
 While the NFIP had promising goals, it got off to a slow start be-
cause of waning community participation.40 Because only 100,000 poli-
cyholders had signed on by 1972, Congress decided that greater efforts 
to promote the Program were needed.41 The effort came in the form of 
the National Flood Disaster Protection Act (NFDPA) of 1973, which 
made the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for the protection of 
SFHA properties.42 Participation in the NFIP skyrocketed following the 
passage of the NFDPA.43 Congress passed the National Flood Insurance 
Reform Act (NFIA) of 1994 to continue the growth of the NFIP.44 
                                                                                                                      
35 44 C.F.R. § 59.2(b). 
36 Id. § 60.3(a)(3). 
37 Id. 
38 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (2006). 
39 King, supra note 15, at 9. 
40 See Houck, supra note 3, at 70. 
41 Id. 
42 Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 
(2006)). 
43 See Davidson, supra note 34, at 368–69. By January 31, 1983, over 2 million policies 
had been issued through the NFIP. Houck, supra note 3, at 72. 
44 Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001). 
States have also begun to address issues of flood coverage by selling insurance in high-risk 
areas, such as the “Wind Pool” in Mississippi. See Natural Catastrophe Insurance, supra 
note 3, at 1; Taylor, supra note 8, at 788–89. 
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B. Write Your Own Program 
 In the passage of the NFIA, Congress made clear that there were 
factors that had restricted the private insurance industry from entering 
into flood insurance.45 However, Congress believed that the federal 
government working side-by-side with private insurers could produce a 
successful flood insurance industry.46 
 The program that Congress had envisioned evolved in 1983 to be-
come the “Write Your Own” (WYO) program.47 Under the WYO pro-
gram, private insurance companies issue policies and settle claims un-
der their own names, but these policies fall under the umbrella of the 
NFIP.48 WYO insurers must abide by the NFIP’s Write Your Own Pro-
gram Financial Control Plan Requirements and Procedures manual, 
monthly transaction reporting requirements, as well as complete re-
views for operations every three years.49 Buyers of insurance can either 
buy through the WYO program, or through the federal government 
itself in the NFIP “direct” program.50 According to a report from the 
Department of Homeland Security, approximately ninety-eight percent 
of flood policies were written by WYO insurers.51 
 There was fear that WYO insurers would blame damage on flood-
ing, which is covered by the NFIP, rather than wind, which is covered by 
homeowner policies.52 The main characteristic that separates the WYO 
program from the direct program is that the insurers are from the pri-
vate industry, meaning that they are most likely also providing home-
owners insurance, which does not include flood insurance coverage.53 
Since homeowner policies almost always cover wind damages, but ex-
clude flood damages, there seems to be a potential conflict of interest 
for any WYO insurer who also provides homeowners insurance.54 
 As will be expanded on in Part III, the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) conducted a study to investigate whether, and to what extent, 
insurance companies participating in the WYO program improperly 
attributed damages from homeowner policies or wind insurance 
                                                                                                                      
45 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b)(1). 
46 Id. § 4001(b)(2). 
47 NFIP, supra note 16, at 22–23. 
48 See id. at 23. 
49 King, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
50 See Wind vs. Flood, supra note 5, at 3. 
51 Id. at 4. 
52 Id. at 1. 
53 See id. at 3. 
54 Id. at 12. 
2010] National Flood Insurance Program and Wind Coverage 371 
pools.55 The OIG found no evidence of WYO insurers attributing more 
damage to flooding rather than to wind following Hurricane Katrina 
despite popular perception to the contrary.56 While sixty-six percent of 
the claims filed in the study had the same insurer providing the flood 
and homeowner policies, most of these claims utilized a different ad-
juster—the person who determines the cause and extent of damage 
after a storm—for each policy which reduced the opportunity for a 
conflict of interest from occurring.57 
C. The Standard Flood Insurance Policy and Flood Insurance Rates 
 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) describes the terms of 
the agreement between a purchaser of insurance and FEMA or a WYO 
insurer.58 The SFIP comes in three forms—the Dwelling Form, the 
General Property Form, and the Residential Condominium Building 
Association Policy Form—with the three forms designed to cover all 
possible occupancies.59 Most notably, the SFIP defines a flood as: 
A general and temporary condition of partial or complete in-
undation of two or more acres of normally dry land area or of 
two or more properties (at least one of which is your prop-
erty) from: a. Overflow of inland or tidal waters; b. Unusual 
and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any 
source; c. Mudflow.60 
If a flood damages an occupancy that is insured under the SFIP, there 
are maximum amounts of coverage available to the property victim.61 A 
residential family unit building or condominium is eligible to receive 
up to $250,000 in building coverage and $100,000 in personal property 
coverage.62 For non-residential buildings, insurance payouts can be as 
high as $500,000 in building coverage and $500,000 in personal prop-
erty.63 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 Wind vs. Flood, supra note 5, at 5. 
57 Id. at 12. 
58 NFIP, supra note 16, at 23. 
59 Id. 
60 FEMA, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Dwelling Form, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
nfip/dp126.pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
61 NFIP, supra note 16, at 25. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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 Before the NFIP can provide relief for flood damage victims, the 
Program must first receive premiums from insurance holders.64 Occu-
pants must pay either the actuarial rates established under the SFIP or 
pay “subsidized” rates.65 “Pre-FIRM” buildings, which were built before 
a community’s application or entrance into the NFIP, receive subsi-
dized rates as authorized by Congress.66 Since many pre-FIRM buildings 
were built well in advance of NFIA’s passage in 1968, Congress believed 
that the buildings were built without actual knowledge of the extent of 
flood risk; therefore, the buildings’ owners should not have to pay the 
actuarial premium.67 Further, it was evident that for many pre-FIRM 
buildings, the majority of a family’s assets were invested in the home 
itself, leaving little to pay the actuarial rate when a storm caused severe 
damage.68 The NFIP viewed subsidies as a tool to persuade more com-
munities to join the Program, and with entrance, encourage more pru-
dent land use decisions from the communities as they follow flood 
maps and other mitigation measures.69 Subsidized rates are paid at an 
estimated thirty-five to forty percent of what the actuarial rate will be 
for buildings with risk of flooding.70 
 Congress did not intend for the Pre-FIRM subsidies to last forever.71 
If a pre-FIRM structure is substantially improved, there is a requirement 
under the NFIP that it meet current construction and building code 
standards.72 The NFIP envisions a scenario in which subsidized rates will 
be phased out over time.73 That vision has come to fruition.74 At the be-
ginning of the Program, seventy percent of the issued policies were sub-
sidized, compared to roughly twenty-eight percent of the policies in 
2007.75 
 To make up for the losses incurred on subsidized premiums, the 
NFIP sets a premium level paid by NFIP participants that establishes the 
                                                                                                                      
64 See generally King, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining the differences in rates and subsi-
dies offered under the NFIP). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 NFIP, supra note 16, at 26. 
68 King, supra note 15, at 14. 
69 See id. 
70 NFIP, supra note 16, at 26. 
71 See King, supra note 15, at 15. 
72 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (2009). 
73 See Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood 
Insurance, 26 Miss. C. L. Rev. 3, 16 (2006). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
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“average historical loss year.”76 FEMA must determine the needed reve-
nue to meet the average historical loss year based upon the number of 
policies outstanding and the expected losses and program expenses.77 
 For buildings that are considered post-FIRM, or built after a com-
munity’s entrance into the NFIP, actuarial rates are applied to the struc-
tures to reflect risks of building in flood-prone areas.78 The actuarial 
rates rely on the flood-risk zone that a building is built in, such as an 
SFHA.79 Other factors in deciding the actuarial rate include the height 
of the lowest floor above or below the Base Flood Elevation (BFE), the 
type of building, and the size of the building.80 The most important of 
these factors is the zone in which the building is to be built since FEMA 
bases flood rates for post-FIRM structures on their exposure to damage, 
and the FIRM is designed to estimate flood damage.81 For instance, a 
building that is to be erected in “Zone A” on a FIRM has a one percent 
annual flood risk and a twenty-six percent risk of flooding over the 
course of a thirty-year mortgage.82 A property owner is required to pur-
chase flood insurance in order to obtain a loan from a federally regu-
lated lender if their property is located in “Zone A,” which is found in a 
high-risk area, or an SFHA.83 
D. Repetitive Loss Problem 
 “Repetitive Loss Properties” (RLP) have been one of FEMA’s larg-
est challenges in its management of the NFIP.84 A repetitive loss prop-
erty is defined as any insurable building that has incurred at least two 
claims of $1000 or more from the NFIP within any ten-year rolling pe-
riod since 1978.85 RLPs are a major financial strain on the NFIP.86 Ac-
cording to a 2005 study, while only one percent of NFIP policies are 
RLPs, these one percent of polices account for an average of thirty per-
                                                                                                                      
76 King, supra note 15, at 7. 
77 Id. at 15. 
78 NFIP, supra note 16, at 27. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. 
82 Floodsmart.gov, Flooding and Flood Risks: Defining Flood Risks, http://www.flood 
smart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flooding_flood_risks/defining_flood_risks.jsp (last visited May 
14, 2010). 
83 Id. 
84 See King, supra note 15, at 5. 
85 FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.fema.gov/txt/rebuild/repetitive_loss_faqs.txt (last visited May 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
Frequently Asked Questions]. 
86 Id. 
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cent of the total claim payouts.87 Since RLPs are such a small percent-
age of the Program, yet require such a large percentage of payouts, 
they have increased NFIP’s annual losses and have made it increasingly 
challenging for the Program to properly allocate resources to prepare 
for future flood mitigation efforts.88 To date, the NFIP stands $17.3 bil-
lion in debt to the U.S. Treasury.89 
 To deal with the difficulties presented by RLPs, President George 
W. Bush signed the Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2004.90 The Act reauthorized the NFIP through Sep-
tember 200891 and was aimed at reducing losses to properties for which 
repetitive flood insurance claim payments have been made.92 Congress 
found that the vast majority of RLPs are pre-FIRM buildings, meaning 
that they are subsidized under the NFIP, which further exacerbates the 
discrepancy between premiums paid and payouts incurred on behalf of 
the Program.93 
 A prominent attribute of the 2004 Act is a pilot program that aims 
at mitigating the damages of RLPs.94 Money is transferred from the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Fund to the National Flood Mitigation Fund, 
which provides these funds to state and local governments in exchange 
for RLP mitigation efforts.95 While the mitigation efforts vary depend-
ing on the individual circumstances of an RLP, some of the strategies 
employed include removing buildings from SFHAs, elevating buildings 
above the BFE for the given area, or local drainage improvement that 
complies with the standards of NFIP.96 The 2004 Act requires that if a 
property owner refuses an offer of flood mitigation, his or her insur-
ance premium will be raised to 150% of the chargeable rate.97 How-
                                                                                                                      
87 King, supra note 15, at 5. 
88 Id. at 20. RLPs are part of the “adverse selection” problem, where policyholders are 
centralized in a high-risk area, leaving the insurer unable to spread its losses. See id. at 23–24. 
89 Anthony R. Wood, U.S. Faces $20 Billion Flood-Insurance Debt, Philadelphia In-
quirer, Oct. 14, 2008, at A6 available at http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/2008 
1014_U_S__faces__20_billion_flood-insurance_debt.html. 
90 Pub. L. No. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
91 King, supra note 15, at 29. 
92 Pub. L. No. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712, 712 (2004). 
93 Pub. L. No. 108-264, § 2(7), 118 Stat. 712, 713. 
94 King, supra note 15, at 29. 
95 Id. at 30. 
96 FEMA, Answers to Questions About the NFIP, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/ 
replps.shtm (last visited May 14, 2010). 
97 King, supra note 15, at 31. 
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ever, at no time can the premium reach a level that exceeds the actuar-
ial rate of the property.98 
II. Gulf Coast History 
A. Geography 
 The Gulf Coast presents great economic and ecologic value to the 
United States.99 Economically, nearly thirty-four percent of the U.S. 
natural gas supply and over twenty-nine percent of the nation’s crude 
oil supply move through Louisiana.100 The Gulf Coast region also pro-
duced the largest commercial fish and shellfish landings in the conti-
nental United States during 2003–2004.101 Ecologically, the coastline 
provides habitat for birds migrating from North America to South 
America.102 The coast also provides essential marshlands and barrier 
islands which buffer communities from winds and floods.103 
 The easy access of the Gulf Coast is also the region’s largest vul-
nerability.104 For example, New Orleans develops around the curve of 
the Mississippi River and is bordered by Lake Pontchartrain and Lake 
Borgne, which opens to the Gulf of Mexico.105 The threats of New Or-
leans’ surrounding waters are exacerbated by the fact that the city is 
sinking.106 Deposition of sediments provided by the Mississippi histori-
cally counter the subsidence of New Orleans’ marsh.107 However, due 
to man-made facilities such as levees, sediments from the Mississippi are 
not gathering in New Orleans and the lack of replenishment for the 
natural subsidence is causing the city to fall farther below sea level.108 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. 
99 Gregory J. Smith, Restoring Resilience to the Gulf of Mexico Coast, in Science and the 
Storms: The USGS Response to the Hurricanes of 2005: U.S. Geological Survey 
Circular 1306, at 1, 2 (G.S. Farris et al. eds., 2007), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ 
circ/1306/pdf/c1306_ch1_a.pdf [hereinafter Science and the Storms]. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 3. The Gulf Coast is vulnerable in large part because of the transformation 
of wetlands to open water because of subsidence, sea-level rise, and erosion, all of which 
have been amplified or accelerated by human processes such as gas and oil extraction and 
channelization and leveeing of rivers. Id. 
105 Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: 
What Went Wrong and Why 5 (2007), available at http://www.asce.org/files/pdf/ERP 
report.pdf [hereinafter ASCE]. 
106 Id. at 8. 
107 See id. 
108 Id. 
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B. Flood Control Projects 
 In 1965, soon after Hurricane Betsy hit the Gulf Coast, Congress 
authorized the construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 
Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 
1965.109 The project, designed to protect areas of Louisiana surround-
ing Lake Pontchartrain from hurricanes, was a joint federal, state, and 
local effort with all parties contributing funds to cover the effort’s 
costs.110 The Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) was responsible for 
the flood control systems employed through the project, most notably 
the levees surrounding the New Orleans region.111 
 The Corps had the choice of two plans to implement in the Lake 
Pontchartrain area.112 The first plan, referred to as the “barrier plan,” 
was originally chosen to be implemented since it was considered the 
cheaper project and was projected as the quicker of the projects to 
complete.113 However, many environmentalists were opposed to the 
barrier project, including Save Our Wetlands, a group that was able to 
procure an injunction against the Corps from constructing barrier pro-
jects.114 Soon thereafter, the Corps decided to proceed with their sec-
ond option, the “high level” plan, because it was less costly than the 
barrier plan and would be more acceptable for the surrounding envi-
ronment.115 Regardless of the decision-making process, the Corps was 
unsuccessful in their design of the levee system that surrounded the 
New Orleans area.116 
C. Hurricane Katrina 
 Hurricanes Dennis, Rita, and Wilma caused significant damage to 
the Gulf Coast during the 2005 storm season;117 however, none of these 
storms compared to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina.118 
                                                                                                                      
109 History of Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project: Testimony Before 
the H. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Anu 
Mittal, Dir., Natural Res.& Env’t). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. at 2–3. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. at 5 (citing Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. A. No. 75–3710 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 
1977)). 
115 Douglas A. Kysar & Thomas O. McGarity, Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, 
the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight, 56 Duke L.J. 179, 190 (2006). 
116 See id. at 191–93. 
117 Science and the Storms, supra note 99, at i. 
118 ASCE, supra note 105, at v–vii. 
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Katrina made landfall with Louisiana as a category three storm on the 
morning of August 29, 2005.119 The storm, which reached a category 
five level while south of the Mississippi River on August 28, created 
surges which reached twenty feet above sea level along New Orleans’ 
levees; Hurricane Katrina did not spare the coasts of Mississippi and 
Alabama.120 Even before sea levels had risen to their highest levels, 
many levees had already breached.121 As early as 5:00a.m., a levee 
breach had left the Lower Ninth Ward flooded.122 In the hours that 
would follow, eighty percent of New Orleans would be underwater and 
over 1000 members of the community would die.123 The Gulf Coast— 
and the NFIP—has not been the same since. 
III. NFIP Post Katrina 
A. Post-Storm Claims 
 Hurricane Katrina took a devastating toll on the NFIP.124 In 2005, 
FEMA paid out $17.5 billion compared to a mere $632 million in 2006 
and $523 million in 2007.125 By May 2007, FEMA had borrowed over 
$17 billion from the federal government, leading President Bush to 
seek authorization for a law that would expand the borrowing powers 
of the NFIP in order to ensure that the Program could continue to pay 
claims for losses resulting from Katrina.126 
 Approximately one and a half years after Katrina, FEMA an-
nounced that it had already resolved over ninety percent of its claims 
arising out of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.127 Private insurers also pub-
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licized their efforts in resolving homeowners insurance claims.128 The 
Insurance Information Institute claimed that ninety-five percent of 
homeowners insurance claims in Louisiana and Mississippi had been 
settled within a year of the tragedy.129 An IPSOS Public Affairs poll even 
found that four in five claim-filers were happy with the results of the 
process.130 
 However, a troubling statistic in the aftermath of Katrina was the 
poor participation rate of homes covered under the NFIP.131 New Or-
leans was reported to have the highest participation rate of all of the 
communities in the Gulf Coast region, but even in New Orleans, par-
ticipation did not break sixty percent.132 Nationally, the number of 
buildings in flood prone areas to secure flood insurance is estimated at 
around twenty percent.133 
B. Wind vs. Water Disputes 
1. Conflict of Interest 
 The most difficult insurance controversy to emerge from Katrina 
arose from the distinction between wind and water when assessing the 
damage to homes.134 The difficulty in assessing whether a home was 
damaged because of wind or flooding is tremendous when the assessor 
is forced to make a determination based on a mere slab of concrete.135 
Potential conflicts of interest emerged immediately after the storm 
based upon the fact that homeowner policies, while covering wind, do 
not cover flooding.136 Since many WYO insurers, who are backed by the 
federal government for flood losses, also provide homeowners policies, 
some speculated that these insurers had assessed damage as flood-
related rather than wind-related in an effort to avoid financial liability.137 
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 As previously mentioned, a study from the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral (OIG) found no evidence of WYO insurers attributing wind dam-
ages to flooding.138 While the OIG found that over thirty percent of its 
sample did include error in terms of assessing the cause of damage, only 
2 of 131 instances of error clearly showed improper delegation of wind 
damage to the NFIP.139 The OIG report does illustrate, however, just 
how difficult it is to distinguish between wind and flood damage when 
both occur concurrently.140 Further, a 2007 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) study determined that there is a conflict of interest in al-
lowing a WYO company to be responsible for adjusting both a home-
owners policy and an NFIP flood insurance policy at the same time.141 
2. Litigation 
 The controversy of wind versus flood escalated when Mississippi 
Attorney General Jim Hood sued Allstate Insurance Co., petitioning 
the court to void flood exclusions from homeowners policies and the-
reby compel the insurance company to pay for damage from the 
storm.142 Allstate responded that it did not intend to pay claims that 
they had never insured.143 Allstate emphasized that the NFIP had taken 
serious efforts to advertise flood insurance in the Gulf Coast, and that 
Allstate policyholders clearly understood that they were not insured for 
flooding.144 
 The litigation that followed Katrina did little to clarify whether 
homeowners policies could be uniformly interpreted.145 The main issue 
in much of the litigation was whether flood exclusions should deprive 
policyholders of their claims when both wind and flooding contributed 
to losses.146 
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 One court employed a narrow analysis of the term “flood.”147 In 
Buente v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., the District Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi denied the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment because the plaintiffs’ home was destroyed by a 
tidal wave in the storm, the coverage of which being clearly and unam-
biguously excluded from coverage in the policy.148 The main issue was 
whether the damage to the plaintiffs’ home was attributable to the 
flood exclusions in the Allstate policy.149 The plaintiffs were insured 
under a Deluxe Homeowners Policy that Allstate has issued.150 The pol-
icy insured against “sudden and accidental direct physical loss . . . ex-
cept as limited or excluded by this policy.”151 The exclusions to the pol-
icy were losses caused by “[f]lood, including, but not limited to surface 
water, waves, tidal water or overflow of any body of water, or spray from 
any of these, whether or not driven by wind.”152 
 With no dispute that water entered the home and lead to damage, 
Allstate believed that their policy provisions were “clear and unambigu-
ous.”153 The plaintiffs believed that since “storm surge” was not specifi-
cally listed or defined in Allstate’s exclusionary policy, that it should 
have been covered as a loss.154 
 The court, ruling in favor of Allstate, made clear that the exclu-
sions to the policy were written broadly with the intent of excluding 
inundation damages.155 The court found that since the water that en-
tered the plaintiffs’ home was tidal water, it fell under the definition of 
flooding, which was found in the exclusionary provision of the plain-
tiffs’ homeowners policy.156 
 Further litigation surrounded the use of anti-concurrent causation 
(ACC) clauses found in many homeowner policies.157 In Tuepker v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., State Farm’s motion to dismiss was denied af-
ter the court concluded that an ACC clause in a homeowners policy was 
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unenforceable when wind and flooding both play a role in the destruc-
tion because the clause was ambiguous.158 Major insurers relied on 
ACC clauses as their justification for only paying for damage that was 
clearly isolated to wind alone.159 The ACC clause in question read: 
2. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which 
would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the 
following excluded events. We do not insure for such loss re-
gardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other 
causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concur-
rently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce 
the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or gradu-
ally, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natu-
ral or external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination 
of these.160 
State Farm argued that the language of their ACC clause barred cover-
age for inseparable damage, as long as the damage would not have oc-
curred in the absence of water.161 
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, meaning 
that the insureds could not recover for damages resulting from a storm 
surge.162 The combination of the ACC clause and the water damage 
exclusion found in the State Farm policy led the court to reason that 
“indivisible damage caused by both excluded perils and covered perils 
or other causes” was not covered under the policy.163 
 The Fifth Circuit also handled litigation in Louisiana, beginning 
with In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.164 The plaintiffs in the case 
were policyholders who had purchased homeowners, renters, or com-
mercial property insurance.165 The plaintiffs argued that the negligent 
design, construction, and maintenance of levees caused the flooding of 
New Orleans.166 The plaintiffs argued further that since policies did not 
clearly exclude damages that were caused by negligence, they should be 
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entitled to relief.167 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
the water that flowed through the failed levees of New Orleans consti-
tuted a flood regardless of the reasons.168 As such, the court ruled that 
the cause of flooding was immaterial and that the flood itself was unam-
biguously excluded from coverage under plaintiffs’ all-risk policies.169 
C. Action for Reform 
1. State Action 
 Many coastal states have taken action to deal with insurance avail-
ability and affordability issues following storms.170 For instance, follow-
ing Hurricane Andrew, Florida found its insurance industry in turmoil, 
leading the state legislature to create a state-sponsored insurance sys-
tem.171 Numerous states have become insurers for people in high-risk 
areas.172 These states have created wind pools, which are insurance 
pools available for property owners who cannot find coverage else-
where.173 The pools also provide reinsurance, which is essentially insur-
ance for insurance companies.174 Normally an insurance company will 
pay a premium to a private reinsurance company who will indemnify it 
for some of its exposure on issued policies.175 Essentially an insurer 
hedges its losses by ensuring the certainty of a smaller loss.176 Often, the 
state wind pool is the insurer of last resort for many coastal communi-
ties.177 
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2. NFIP Reform Efforts 
 Following Katrina, there has been political pressure to amend the 
NFIP to include wind coverage as well as flood coverage.178 On Septem-
ber 23, 2008, the House of Representatives passed a seven month NFIP 
extension so that lawmakers could patch up the differences envisioned 
for the future of the Program.179 Prior to the financial crisis beginning 
in the fall of 2008, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Bar-
ney Frank and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd had 
been attempting to finalize efforts to reform the NFIP.180 
 The House proposal, H.R. 3121, referred to as The Flood Insur-
ance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, would have established 
the Multiple Peril Insurance Act as introduced by Rep. Gene Taylor (D. 
MS).181 With many insurance companies withdrawing from coastal ar-
eas, state-sponsored insurers have been forced to handle a dispropor-
tionate number of policies.182 The Multiple Peril Insurance Act, or H.R. 
920, which was incorporated into H.R. 3121, would have eased that 
burden and provided protection to homeowners following damage re-
sulting from both flood and wind.183 Unlike more traditional home-
owner and federal policies, H.R. 920 would have provided approval and 
payment of claims without requiring that a specific cause of loss be 
identified.184 The bill aimed at allowing up to $500,000 for any residen-
tial unit and $150,000 for any contents related to the unit.185 For non-
residential units, the maximum building coverage would have been in-
creased to $1,000,000, and the contents of the structure could be 
covered up to $750,000.186 
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 H.R. 920 was authored in an effort to eliminate the use of ACC 
clauses from insurers who provide homeowners insurance and also par-
ticipate in the WYO program.187 To procure wind coverage, a home-
owner would need to also acquire flood coverage.188 Further, communi-
ties would need to adopt building codes consistent with the 
International Building Codes (IBC) before members of their commu-
nities would be eligible for the multiple peril insurance.189 The IBC re-
quirement would result in premiums being set through the adjustment 
of building characteristics and other construction methods.190 
 The bill’s ultimate goal was stability in the insurance market.191 In 
many coastal communities insurance companies have left, deciding 
against writing policies in high risk areas.192 Agents would receive 
commissions for selling the multiperil policy and be reimbursed for 
losses stemming from administrative expenses.193 The Act would also 
spread hurricane risk geographically.194 The drafters believed that since 
a multiple peril program would be applicable to a wider area of coastal 
communities than private insurance currently accommodates, the Act 
would stabilize the economics of the NFIP.195 Further, the program 
would eliminate any doubt for homeowners as to whether they would 
be covered by insurance when a storm was looming.196 
 H.R. 920 passed through the House and the Financial Services 
Committee, but was delayed on its way to the Senate.197 There is no 
question that proposals for the NFIP to include wind coverage will be 
addressed in the near future.198 
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IV. Problems Facing NFIP Wind Addition 
A. Increased Financial Instability of NFIP 
1. NFIP Debt 
 The addition of wind coverage to the NFIP will further exacerbate 
economic problems for an already fiscally unsound program.199 A 2006 
letter from Congressional Budget Office Director Donald Marron to 
Senator Judd Gregg illustrates that the NFIP’s financial position is un-
sustainable because FEMA lacks both the resources to cover the Pro-
gram’s costs and the authority to make changes that can ensure fiscal 
success.200 Marron notes that the Program’s current and future obliga-
tions for policyholder claims, operating expenses, and debt service are 
likely to far exceed its income from premiums.201 
 The NFIP is currently $17.3 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury, 
with the number likely reaching the $20 billion mark in the near fu-
ture.202 The Senate estimates that the interest on NFIP debt alone is 
more than thirty percent of the premiums received by the Program in 
2007.203 The NFIP’s debt is attributable to its failure to reduce subsidies 
or encourage prudent building choices in flood-risk zones.204 Ap-
proximately $500 million is lost annually to subsidized properties that 
fail to pay premiums based on the true risks that they face.205 Further, 
repetitive loss properties are a significant drain on the Program.206 
 Adding wind coverage to the NFIP will be inefficient because the 
Program will likely stray from some of the key priorities of the private 
wind insurance market.207 Private market wind insurance policies can 
be very expensive in high-risk areas.208 High prices are nothing more 
than a reflection of the risk facing properties rather than an ineffective 
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market.209 A key to successful private wind insurance markets is adjust-
ing insurance rates to mirror the true risk posed by wind damage.210 
 A federal program providing wind coverage will likely subsidize the 
price of wind insurance, rather than charging actuarial rates that would 
be considered unaffordable by many politicians looking to serve the 
interests of their constituents.211 The history of the NFIP’s policies illus-
trates this theory.212 The Program allows for below actuarial rates to be 
applied to pre-FIRM buildings, thereby straining the financial viability 
of the Program.213 RLPs, accounting for only one percent of all total 
policies nationwide, sap the NFIP of thirty percent of its total claim 
payouts.214 A wind coverage program that is promoted by the federal 
government would produce subsidized rates that would fall into the 
same debt pattern as subsidized flood policies.215 
2. Taxpayer Burden 
 Taxpayers—most of whom will not benefit from the Program—will 
be further burdened by the addition of wind coverage to the NFIP.216 
One study found that if a hurricane season comparable to 2005 were to 
occur again in 2009, the proposals for NFIP reform would dispropor-
tionately burden many states.217 California taxpayers would pay $19 bil-
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lion; New Yorkers $11 billion; $6 billion each for residents of Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey; and $4 billion each for taxpayers from Massachu-
setts, Michigan and Virginia.218 None of these states would be substan-
tially affected by a hurricane of the magnitude of the 2005 storms.219 
 If wind coverage is added to the NFIP, and a greater amount of 
people begin purchasing policies in centralized risk areas, the Program 
will deal with greater issues surrounding adverse selection.220 Providing 
subsidies to combat the problem of adverse selection will lead to other 
issues in the NFIP.221 Adverse selection occurs when an insurance car-
rier’s rates are forced higher because the insurer does not have an ade-
quate spread of risk to cover expenses and pay losses.222 The demo-
graphics that tend to purchase the insurance through the carrier are 
usually in high-risk areas that are likely to suffer a loss.223 As less people 
can afford the rates of insurance, the policy holders become centralized 
in areas of high risk, which heightens an issuer’s exposure to potential 
damage.224 The current statistics in the NFIP illustrate the problems of 
centralized policies.225 The states of Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Lou-
isiana, and Texas account for over sixty percent of the current policies 
under the NFIP.226 Even so, only about twenty percent of homeowners 
living in flood-prone areas purchase flood insurance.227 
B. Private Wind Insurance Is Working 
1. Private Insurance Model 
 The addition of wind coverage to the NFIP will handicap a rather 
efficient private wind insurance market.228 The federal government 
historically offers insurance, such as flood insurance, when the private 
market does not offer coverage that the public requires.229 The private 
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wind insurance market makes wind insurance readily available; how-
ever, the private market has been supplemented by state-sponsored 
wind pools that augment the availability of private-market policies to 
homeowners.230 
 The private insurance industry survives on risk.231 A for-profit in-
surance company employs an educated gamble that the premiums they 
collect will ensure profit for the company whenever it issues a policy.232 
By placing the wind insurance market in the hands of the NFIP and the 
Department of Treasury, the risk of the gamble failing is shifted from 
the private market, which is the most efficient sector in the insurance 
arena, to the federal taxpayers.233 Taxpayer risk is inappropriate con-
sidering that the private insurance industry can better assess appropri-
ate premium levels.234 FEMA lacks necessary in-house wind modeling 
and actuarial expertise that most private insurance market participants 
have at their disposal to develop, interpret, and translate wind models 
into premium rates.235 For instance, most insurance market partici-
pants use computer programs offered by modeling firms to estimate 
the financial consequences of natural catastrophe scenarios while man-
aging financial exposure.236 
2. Refuting Bad-Faith Allegations 
 Proponents of H.R. 3121 believe that bad faith among WYO insur-
ers is a primary reason that wind coverage should be included under the 
NFIP.237 Their theory is that claim adjusters working for a WYO com-
pany on homeowners’ flood and wind claims are not objective and at-
tribute more damage to flood damage rather than wind damage be-
cause flood losses are paid out through the federal government rather 
than the private company.238 However, an OIG report has refuted that 
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argument.239 The OIG report also interviewed twenty NFIP adjusters to 
determine how they conducted their claims adjustments.240 No adjusters 
felt pressure from WYOs to falsely attribute damage to flooding.241 In 
most cases where a homeowner had both flood and wind policies with 
one WYO company, the company used a different adjuster for each pol-
icy to prevent any conflict of interest in the damage assessment.242 
 Ironically, the addition of wind coverage to the NFIP could pro-
duce more conflicts of interest.243 Hypothetically, WYO insurers will be 
providing wind and flood coverage under the NFIP, as well as their own 
separate wind coverage.244 Officials from the GAO and FEMA agree 
that WYO insurers face a conflict of interest because of the incentive to 
sell federally backed multiple peril policies to high-risk customers while 
targeting their own policies to lower-risk customers.245 
3. Cost and Coverage Discrepancies 
 The extension of wind coverage in the NFIP will most likely ex-
perience limited participation because the federal program will be 
more expensive than purchasing a combination of flood insurance 
through the NFIP and wind insurance through a state-run program.246 
A GAO study concluded that for a residential property in Louisiana, 
combining the maximum policy limits of the NFIP flood program and 
the state wind program policy limit would provide a homeowner 
$1,220,000 in coverage.247 In comparison, a homeowner would only be 
able to receive $650,000 through a federal dual wind and flood pol-
icy.248 The disparity is magnified for commercial properties, which 
would see a difference of $6,590,000 between NFIP flood and state 
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wind policies as compared to the federal dual policy.249 The lower cov-
erage rates available to homeowners under the federal proposal may 
lead some to obtain additional insurance on top of the federal pro-
gram.250 By purchasing extra coverage, homeowners would need to ob-
tain a determination of total wind damage in order to separate their 
policy, which will lead to confusion, disputes, and litigation that advo-
cates of reform similar to H.R. 3121 are trying to avoid.251 
C. Enabling Improper Land Use 
 Political pressure and affordability issues will most likely push fed-
eral wind coverage below market value, which in turn will reduce the 
incentives for people to relocate to safer areas.252 Two of the primary 
goals of the NFIP are to encourage state and local governments to make 
appropriate land use decisions and to guide future development away 
from locations that are threatened by flood hazards.253 The NFIP has 
not achieved either goal to date.254 
 The communities reliant on the potential federal wind insurance 
will need to realize the dangers and risks that threaten them.255 While 
there are many instances of people living in at-risk areas because they 
could either not afford to live elsewhere or were too unaware of the 
flood hazard to make informed decisions on habitability,256 many peo-
ple in floodplains largely ignore the danger around them.257 Part of this 
problem falls squarely on the NFIP, which negligently maintains flood 
maps and fails to effectively promote mitigation options in at-risk com-
munities.258 In fact, some believe that the NFIP supports development in 
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high-risk areas.259 Communities themselves must bear part of the blame 
because ultimate authority over the management of the programs lies in 
their hands.260 NFIP participation statistics illustrate that for whatever 
reason, consumers tend to underestimate the risks they face.261 
D. Moving Forward Without Wind 
 There are many necessary improvements that must be made to the 
NFIP before the inclusion of wind insurance is considered.262 Most im-
portantly, the NFIP’s priority should be regaining financial stability 
without accruing additional liability.263 The first step towards achieving 
financial stability will be to require correct administration of the Pro-
gram.264 FEMA must update its flood risk maps to ensure that taxpayers 
are not subsidizing construction in unsafe areas.265 The Program must 
strive for actuarially sound rates, which will require sufficient premiums 
to build reserves for expected future flood losses.266 The main source of 
financial trouble for the NFIP—repetitive loss properties—must be 
heavily reduced or eliminated if the Program is to rebound from the 
debt it currently faces.267 
 Instead of adding wind coverage to the NFIP, Congress should focus 
on forgiving the NFIP’s current debt268 and encourage safety-oriented 
reform solutions for the Program.269 By forgiving the Program’s debt, the 
NFIP can look towards the future by building reserves for the next inevi-
table storm.270 By encouraging safety-oriented solutions for the NFIP, 
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such as strictly enforcing community land-use measures, Congress can 
ensure that when the next storm hits the gulf coast, homeowners will be 
better prepared to handle any damage that occurs.271 
 Leaving state wind programs and the private insurance market as 
the primary sources of wind coverage will benefit homeowners and the 
NFIP.272 Homeowners will benefit because they will be able to obtain 
higher levels of coverage through state wind programs than they will 
through the proposed federal model.273 Potentially, many homeowners 
could be left inadequately insured under the federal program.274 The 
NFIP will profit because FEMA administrative resources will not be 
drained in implementing a new program.275 Instead of stretching its 
workforce thin, FEMA can dedicate its work to correcting the manage-
ment and financial problems that currently plague the NFIP.276 
Conclusion 
 The National Flood Insurance Program is essential for the protec-
tion and insurance of millions of American homeowners who stand in 
the path of impending natural disasters. Following the storms of 2005, 
the NFIP has experienced financial failure which threatens its very exis-
tence. Now is the time that Congress must look to rectify the Program so 
that it can achieve fiscal stability. This entails re-developing outdated 
flood maps and strengthening mitigation measures. However, rectifying 
the Program cannot include the addition of wind coverage. Adding the 
additional liability of wind coverage to the NFIP will exacerbate linger-
ing problems such as subsidized coverage that fails to meet actuarial 
standards, adverse selection, and improper land use. While insuring that 
people are safe from high winds and flooding should be a priority for 
legislators, attempting to do so by subsidizing risky development at the 
expense of federal taxpayers is fiscally unsound and unsafe in practice. 
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